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Abstract
In 2009 the German Federal Constitutional Court introduced the principle
of “public nature of elections” [1]. This principle requires that when using
electronic voting systems it must be possible for the citizen to verify the es-
sential steps in the election process and in the ascertainment of the results
reliably and without special expert knowledge. Unfortunately, none of the
existing systems complies with this principle. As a result, the use of elec-
tronic voting systems in Germany for parliamentary elections has stopped.
Nevertheless, electronic voting systems are necessary and would improve the
situation, especially for elections with complex ballots and voting rules, for
example some local elections in Germany or parliamentary elections in Bel-
gium and Luxembourg. The concept proposed by Volkamer et al. [2] was
analyzed by a legal expert and evaluated to comply with the German legal
requirements for local elections in the state of Hesse [3]. In this paper we
specify and concretize processes that were left open in the concept, and im-
plement a prototype. We evaluated this prototype in a user study that was
conducted alongside the university elections at the Technische Universtität
Darmstadt in June 2013. The results of the study show that most of the
participants were satisfied with the prototype and would support its use for
the upcoming university elections. We also report some lessons learned.
Keywords: electronic voting system, software-independence, polling
station elections, implementation, evaluation, user study
1. Introduction
Electronic voting continues to be a topic of interest with widespread use in
di↵erent contexts and countries. While countries like U.S., Estonia, Norway,
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Switzerland, and Finland use electronic voting for legally-binding elections,
others such as the Netherlands and Germany have stopped their use, due to
legal requirements.
Germany seems to have the strictest legal requirements with respect to the
use of electronic voting systems in legally-binding elections. Electronic voting
systems have to comply with the principle of “public nature of elections”,
which was introduced by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany in
2009 [1]. Hence, when using an electronic voting system, it must be possible
for the citizen to verify the essential steps in the election act and in the ascer-
tainment of the results reliably and without special expert knowledge. This
holds true for federal, state and local elections in Germany. The use of elec-
tronic voting systems in Germany is especially necessary for local elections
with complex ballots and voting rules, for example local elections in Hesse.
To the best of our knowledge, the concept introduced by Volkamer et al. [2]
is the only one that has been analyzed by a legal expert with respect to, and
evaluated to comply with, the German legal requirements for local elections
in Hesse [3].1 However, before this concept can be used in such elections, a
number of processes need to be concretized, specified and implemented.
Volkamer et al. [2] proposed the printing of multiple paper ballots in the
vote casting process, but this was not concretized. Hence, we concretized the
vote casting process by comparing advantages and disadvantages of multiple
versus single printouts. From a concept level the following processes need to
be specified:
• Enabling/disabling the voting device.
• Preventing permanent storage of votes.
• Ensuring physical security.
Afterwards, we implemented a prototype, in order to evaluate the electronic
voting system and to improve our technical approaches. To enable the use
1As [3] is in German, we provide here a short summary: 1) Voters can verify their
printouts without any specialist knowledge and without relying on the system’s integrity.
Independent of the QR-Code, the human-readable part is determinative. 2) The system
enables a fully manual counting, similar to the traditional one. 3) The system strengthens
the principle of “public nature of elections”, because voters better understand the impact
of their selections, and the tallying process might be faster than in traditional system.
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of the prototype in user studies, we also developed adequate user guide-
lines/procedures for voters and poll workers. Furthermore, we conducted a
user study alongside university elections at the Technische Universität Darm-
stadt in June 2013. The focus of the user study was to evaluate the voting
phase, while an implementation and evaluation of the tallying phase is left
for future work.
2. Concept: EasyVote
The EasyVote concept proposed by Volkamer et al. [2] mainly addresses
challenges in elections with complex ballots and voting rules, e.g., some local
elections in Germany or parliamentary elections in Belgium and Luxembourg.
However, this concept is applicable to any type of elections. The novelty of
EasyVote is that it combines the advantages of the traditional paper-based
system and those of an electronic voting system. Furthermore, according to
the definitions of Rivest et al. [4] EasyVote is software-independent.
Voting phase. The voter first identifies herself to the poll workers,
similar to traditional paper-based elections. Afterwards, the voter enters the
voting booth and uses the electronic voting device to prepare the ballot by
selecting candidates. When the voter confirms the selected candidates, the
electronic voting device starts the printing process and at the same time
deletes all electronic data, i.e. all voter’s selections.2 The printout, which
contains voter’s selections, consists of two parts: a human-readable and a
machine-readable (a QR-Code) part.3 The voter verifies that the human-
readable part contains the candidates selected on the electronic voting device.
Finally, the voter folds the printout, leaves the voting booth and deposits
the printout into the ballot box. The components used in the vote casting
process, are shown on the left side of Figure 1.
Tallying phase. Similar to the traditional paper-based system, poll
workers first open the sealed ballot box, and verify that the number of print-
outs (paper ballots) matches the number of voters in the electoral register.
Afterwards, the poll workers start counting, by scanning each single printout.
Thus, they scan the QR-Code and verify that its content, shown on a moni-
2At this point in time, data are deleted from the vote casting software, i.e. on the
software level.
3The machine-readable part, which contains the exact information as the human-
readable part, enables an automatic tallying of the printouts.
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tor, matches the human-readable part of the printout. The scanned printout
is added to the intermediate result, shown on a second monitor, when the
poll workers have verified and confirmed its content. Additional components
used in the tallying process, are displayed on the right side of Figure 1.
Figure 1: EasyVote components.
3. Concretizing the vote casting process
Volkamer et al. [2] propose to enable voters to print several printouts
(paper ballots) in the vote casting process. The main motivation for enabling
multiple printouts is to ensure secrecy w.r.t. a malicious voting device that
would store the sequential order of cast votes. This approach also enables
the voter to become familiar with the system. However, when concretizing
this approach a number of challenges and disadvantages arise. The major
challenge of this approach is ensuring that each voter casts only one vote
(only one printout is deposited into the ballot box). This challenge can be
addressed by a number of di↵erent techniques: Voters can be provided an
envelope which they deposit into the ballot box. Multiple printouts in an
envelope makes that vote invalid. Another technique is that poll workers
stamp the backside of the printout, before the voter deposits it into the
ballot box. A very exotic technique is by using accurate weighing scales.
Thus, the voter would place the folded printout( s) on the weighing scale
before depositing it/them into the ballot box. However, poll workers would
identify if more than one folded printout is placed on the weighing scale,
because independent of the amount of ink on printouts, the weight of a
single printout is relatively constant. A fourth technique is to provide poll
workers with a counter that displays the exact number of printed printouts
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during a single vote casting process. Thereby, poll workers are required to
verify that the voter cast only one printout and secretly destroys the rest.
All these techniques either increase costs or the organizational e↵ort to-
wards poll workers. Stamping the backside of printouts as previously agreed
with an attacker might lead to voter coercion or vote selling. Furthermore,
by using the fourth technique di↵erent attacks such as chain voting [5] or
voter coercion are still possible. For instance, the attacker can either leave a
printout in the voting booth or take one out and give it to the voter. Then,
the attacker needs to observe that the voter spends a specific time in the
voting booth.4 These attacks might be prevented by using the fourth tech-
nique, however destroying printouts secretly and verifying the exact number
of destroyed printouts seem to be two contradicting actions.
In contrast, enabling only a single printout in the vote casting process
prevents all attacks mentioned above. However, a challenge of this approach
is that voters can not become “very” familiar with the system during the vote
casting process. Nevertheless, this challenge can be addressed by providing
voters with an online prototype before the actual elections. Another challenge
is that a malicious voting device which stores the sequential order of cast
votes might violate vote secrecy. However, from a legal perspective this
challenge also applies when multiple printouts are allowed. In case of multiple
printouts a malicious voting devices can link a voter with her vote with a
non-negligibly higher probability than from the final election result. Based
on this comparison we recommend to change the EasyVote from multiple to





Table 1: Advantages and disadvantages of multiple versus single printout.
4. Enabling/disabling the voting device
While specifying the process for enabling/disabling the voting device, we
also consider the results of section 3. In that case the process should ensure
4The time interval which is too short to start the printing process.
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that voters can only print a single printout (paper ballot) in the vote casting
process.
The simplest and most secure approach that ensures the printing of a
single printout in the vote casting process, is to automatically disable the
voting device when the printing process starts. Thus, for all following en-
abling approaches we assume that the voting device is disabled when the
printing process starts. The voting device can be enabled by using a token,
e.g. a smart card as in [6] or in Avante Vote-Trakker. This approach in-
creases costs, because the token should be configurable, i.e. to re-enable the
voting device with the same token, the token needs to be re-configured. Fur-
thermore, readers are necessary. Another approach is to implement a timer
that automatically enables the voting device after it has been disabled. This
approach increases the organizational e↵ort for poll workers, as they have
to make sure that voters leave the voting booth, before the voting device is
re-enabled. A third approach is to enable the voting device manually by poll
workers, like most DRE systems. However, this increases the organizational
e↵ort for the poll workers. The voting device can also be enabled remotely
by poll workers using an enabling device. The enabling device, similar to the
Nedap voting machines, is connected via cable to the voting device. This
device can be simple and cheap, as it only needs to show the current state
of the voting device (enabled/disabled) and the interface should only allow
to send an enabling signal to the voting device, for example a single button.
The last combines the advantages of all previous approaches, therefore we
recommend to use this approach to enable the voting device.
5. Preventing permanent storage of votes and ensuring physical
security
EasyVote [2] requires that electronic votes are not stored permanently.
However, a practical approach that meets this requirement has not yet been
specified. In this section we propose a practical approach that meets this
requirement from a hardware level perspective. In order to ensure that votes
are not stored permanently, we introduce the following requirements:
1. The voting device shall consist only of volatile memory, such that when
the power supply is removed all data are irrevocably lost.5
5With voting device we refer to all components in the vote casting process.
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2. The voting device shall not contain any integrated or external network
interface controller.
3. The voting device shall provide only the following input/output sockets:
(a) An input/output socket for the monitor.
(b) An input/output socket for the printer.
(c) An input/output socket for uploading the voting software into
memory.
(d) An input/output socket for the enabling device.
To provide a high guarantee that the voting device meets these require-
ments, we recommend the following five-step approach: 1) Observing the
hardware development process. 2) Certifying/Evaluating the voting system.
3) Verifying that the certified system will be used. 4) Performing random
plausibility-checks. 5) Performing random reverse-engineering of systems af-
ter the elections.
Note that we assume that other technical/organizational requirements,
e.g. verifying the integrity of the voting software, preventing the installation
of hidden cameras in the voting booth, are met.
Ensuring physical security. To ensure physical security the voting
device and the printer should be placed inside securely closed cases, such that
unauthorized physical access is prevented. Further, only the user interface,
i.e. screen and printer output tray can be accessed in the voting booth, while
the processing unit of the voting device and printer are accessed only from
the outside of the booth in a way that anyone in the polling station can
monitor it during the election. Furthermore, all cables should be visually
accessible to the poll workers and fixed to the ground.
6. The EasyVote prototype
In this section we describe the implemented EasyVote prototype, which
includes voter instructions and guidelines/protocols for poll workers.
6.1. Implementation
For the implementation of the prototype we considered all recommenda-
tions made in the sections 3, 4 and 5. The voting software was implemented
in the Java programming language. The voting device consisted of an inte-
grated touch screen (type: elo touch system) and a computer (Motherboard
MS-6535 VER:2; CPU Pentium 4, 2.40 GHz; 512 DDR-SDRAM and a CD-
ROM). The hard disk and the Ethernet network interface controller were
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removed. The printer was a Kyocera FS 1300D. We created a live CD that
included the operating system (Porteus V2.0-i486), a Java run time environ-
ment (jre-7u11-i586-1.jre), the voting software, the drivers for the printer,
touchscreen and the enabling device. The enabling device, shown in Figure
2, included an ATmega 8[7] microcontroller from Amtel for the controlling.
Figure 2: The enabling/disabling device. (English translation)
6.2. Instructions for voters
Usually in real elections voters are informed about the voting system
through the media, e.g. news or advertising, or in the election notification
and polling station. Even though EasyVote is software-independent, there is
no doubt that election integrity is only ensured if voters verify their printouts.
This holds true for all software-independent voting systems that provide voter
verifiable paper audit trails (VV-PATs). Current research show that voters
are not very likely to verify the VV-PATs [8], [9], [10] and [11]. Therefore, in
the user study we integrated voter verifiability instructions, which we have
developed by Budurushi et. al [12]. The verifiability instructions and their
integration in the vote casting process are presented in Figure 3. Additionally
and based on the verifiability instructions, we developed a poster that depicts
all steps in the vote casting process, refer to Figure 4. Finally, we also
developed a video that animates the vote casting process.6
6To watch the video visit the following link: http://tinyurl.com/lhj5no7.
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(a) Instructions for verifying the printouts.
(English translation) (b) Pre-printed instructions on the
printout.
Figure 3: Verifiability instructions and their integration.
6.3. Guidelines and protocols for poll workers
In real elections poll workers are trained and instructed about the elec-
tion, i.e. the voting system in use. Therefore, we developed corresponding
guidelines and protocols, in order to provide poll workers with necessary
information.
Guidelines. We developed the follow guidelines: General, Repeating of
Vote Casting Process, Wrong Printout, Exceptional Cases and Solutions, and
Tallying.
The General guideline provide poll workers with instructions regarding
data privacy protection, voter identification, enabling/disabling the voting
device and the vote casting process. The Repeating of Vote Casting Process
guideline instructs poll workers in case a voter wants to repeat the vote cast-
ing process, e.g. when the voter wants to cast a di↵erent vote (printout) from
the one already printed. The Wrong Printout guideline provides instructions
when voters complain that the printout does not match their intention, i.e.
what they selected on the voting device. This guideline includes a two-step
approach: In the first step, the poll worker and the voter enter the voting
booth together and try to cast (print) a test vote (printout). In case no
problems are identified, the voter is left alone in the voting both to repeat
the process in secret. In case the voter complains again that the printout
does not contain the selections made on the voting device, the voter is given
a sealed envelope that contains all possible pre-printed printouts. Then, the
voter is asked to enter the voting booth, select and cast the appropriate
9
Figure 4: Steps of the vote casting process. (English translation)
printout, and secretly destroy the rest.7 The Exceptional Cases and Solu-
tions guideline provide poll workers with instructions to follow and contact
persons, in case the voting device crashes or the printer does not work, or
there is a power failure. Last but not least, the Tallying guideline included
a poster that depicted all steps in the tallying process, refer to Figure 5.
Figure 5: Steps of the tallying process. (English translation)
Protocols. All protocols required at least two poll workers to record
information, thus enforcing the so called four-eyes principle. Except for the
7Note that the second step is only feasible for “simple” elections. For elections with
complex ballots and voting rules, voters are required to lodge a formal complaint.
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General guideline, we developed for all other guidelines a corresponding pro-
tocol. The following protocols were developed: Preparation of the live CD,
Election Start, Devices and Materials, End of Election, Electoral Register,
Filling Printouts and Changing Cartridges, Complaints, Present Poll Work-
ers, Tallying and Miscellaneous.
We only describe the first four protocols, as all others are self-explanatory
through their naming. The Preparation of the live CD protocol consists of
all steps that are necessary to create a live CD. This includes all specific
information regarding software (operating system, OpenSSL, disc burning
software etc.), and hardware (computer, USB etc.) type and version used.
Additionally the SHA-1 hash value of the live CD should be computed and
recorded into the protocol. Furthermore, the process of creating a second
original live CD should be platform-independent.8 The SHA-1 value of the
second live CD is computed, compared with the SHA-1 hash value of the
first live CD, and recorded into the protocol. This process, which is best-
practice in the field of computer forensics, ensures the integrity of the content
of the live CD, as everyone in possession of the original voting software is
able to create an identical live CD. Note that the live CD was created, the
day before election day in a public process. We had announced it a month
before via our website, and invited people via E-Mail, especially the legal
department of our university. However, only a PhD student of the chemistry
department who had no relationship with our research group was present. In
the Election Start protocol poll workers were required to verify and record
that all documents (guidelines/protocols), devices and materials were pro-
vided. Further, the poll workers should verify that the ballot box is empty,
seal it and record this into the protocol. Finally, when setting up the voting
device poll workers should compute and verify that the SHA-1 hash value of
the live CD matches the value recorded in Preparation of the live CD proto-
col, and record the computed value into the protocol. The most important
part of the Devices and Materials required the poll workers to perform a
plausibility-check w.r.t. volatile memory and network access. Thereby, poll
workers should visually control that no hard disk and no network interface
controller (e.g. WLAN, Ethernet) were installed. Further, poll workers sent
a printing job to the printer and at the same time removed the power. After
8Note that this process enables to detect technical problems or a malicious system
during the creation process of the first original live CD.
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reconnecting the power the printer should not execute the printing job sent
before. Poll workers had to record these plausibility-checks into the proto-
col.9 This protocol also required poll workers to verify and record that all
necessary devices (e.g. printer) and materials (e.g. printouts) were provided.
The End of Election protocol required poll workers to verify that all protocols
were completed and signed. The number of voters in the electoral register
should be recorded into the protocol. Poll workers should also verify and
record that the ballot box is still sealed. Finally, the polling station should
be disassembled and all devices, materials etc. should be transported to the
lab of our research group.
7. Evaluation of the prototype
In this section report the results and lessons learned from the user study
that. The general goal of the user study was to evaluate the prototype from
a technical and practical perspective. We were also interested in the opinion
of the participants regarding the concept (EasyVote) and electronic voting
in general.
7.1. Pre-tests
In order to identify any technical issues and to improve the process in the
vote casting phase, we conducted a number of pre-tests in the lab of our re-
search group. In the pre-tests participated 10 members. This includes mem-
bers of our research group and members of the “Cryptography and Computer
Algebra” research group at the Technische Universität Darmstadt. From a
technical perspective no problems were identified in the pre-tests. Neverthe-
less, we got valuable feedback regarding the process in the vote casting phase.
This feedback mainly addressed the process of introducing participants with
the goals of the user study and the steps in the vote casting software. We
considered this feedback in the user study.
7.2. Experimental design and procedure
The user study took place alongside the day university elections at the
Technische Universität Darmstadt in June 2013. Our polling station was
next to the polling stations of the university elections. For the user study
9Note that due to time and funding restrictions, for the user study we performed only
plausibility-checks.
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we designed a simple test election. In the test election participants voted
by expressing their satisfaction regarding their supervisor. For expressing
the satisfaction we used a five-point Likert scale (always satisfied - mostly
satisfied - sometimes yes sometimes no - rarely satisfied - never satisfied).
In order to cover as many participants as possible, the range consisted of
seven di↵erent types of supervisors in our university: the orientation phase
tutor (for freshers), mentor, bachelor thesis supervisor, master thesis super-
visor, PhD thesis supervisor, superior (for employees), and the president (for
professors). The interfaces of the test elections are presented in Figure 6.
(a) Welcome (b) Options
(c) Preview (d) Finish
Figure 6: Interfaces for the test election. (English translation)
The test election proceeded as follows: Each participant had to pass
through four sequential phases: First, the participant was provided with
oral explanation about the goals and the procedure of the entire experiment.
Afterwards, the participant was explicitly introduced to the vote casting
process. The di↵erent steps were explained using the vote casting poster,
refer to Figure 4 in section 6.2. Thereby, the participant was told that by
selecting only one of the given options, she cast a valid vote, otherwise no
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selection or more than one selections would invalidate her vote. According
to [13, §1, Rn. 23], the principle of the free su↵rage contains the right to cast
invalid votes. Thus, the voting software should support voters to not spoil
their votes unintentionally, but also enable them to cast an invalid vote.10
In the next phase after the identification, the participant entered the voting
booth, made her selections and deposited the printout into the ballot box.
Finally, the participant could fill in the online post-questionnaire either next
to our polling station or from any other preferred location.
7.3. Post-questionnaire
The post-questionnaire measured the following statements by using a five-
points Likert scale (strongly disagree - rather does not apply - neither nor -
rather agree - strongly agree) (English translation):
• “Please briefly tell us your impression of the electronic voting system
that you have just used. Feel free to suggest any improvements”.
• “In the next university elections I would like to use the electronic voting
system I just used”.
• “I would like to cast my vote electronically in the next university’s
elections”.
• “I think that vote secrecy might be violated by the use of the QR-
Code.”
In addition the post-questionnaire collected some demographic data (gender,
age, and education).
7.4. Setup
The polling station consisted of three di↵erent areas: the poll workers’,
the post-questionnaire, and the voting booth area. The poll workers’ area,
is presented in Figure 7(a). The post-questionnaire area, which was outside
of the polling booth is presented in Figure 7(b). The poster used to explain
participants the vote casting steps is presented in Figure 7(c). Finally, Figure
7(d) presents the voting booth area. Furthermore, voters and poll workers
10We are aware that this depends from the corresponding election regulations of each
country.
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were provided with the guidelines and protocols introduced in section 6.2
and 6.3. Note that we used all materials (devices, guidelines, protocols etc.)
several times, because the university elections lasted four days.
(a) Poll workers’ area
(b) The post-questionnaire area.
(c) The vote casting poster.
(d) Inside the voting booth.
Figure 7: The setup of the polling station.
7.5. Recruiting and sample
The participants were recruited verbally, directly after having cast their
vote for the university elections. One of the three poll workers stood in front
of the poll workers’ area and asked people to take part in the experiment.
No payment was provided to the participants. The experiment had 421
participants that cast a vote, but only 198 of them (135 male, 63 female)
between the age of 18 - 59 years filled in the online post-questionnaire. Thus,
in the results we consider only 198 participants. The sample consisted of
students of di↵erent departments (e.g. sociology, psychology, mathematics
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etc.) and employees (e.g. secretaries, care takers, administrative technical
sta↵ etc.) of our university.
7.6. Ethical considerations
Ethical requirements for research involving human respondents are pro-
vided by an ethics commission at the university. These were met, e.g. as all
participants were told before participating in the experiment that data was
stored anonymously and served only for the purpose of the experiment.
7.7. Results
The analysis of the statement “Please briefly tell us your impression of
the electronic voting system that you have just used. Feel free to suggest any
improvements” shows that most of the participants were satisfied with the
prototype, especially with the EasyVote concept. A detailed analysis of this
statement looks as follows: Only 166 out of 198 gave valuable answers. The
32 questionnaires that were not useful contained responses such as (English
translation): “No time”, “hmmm”, “bla” etc. 81 out of the 166 participants
had a positive impression of the system (English translation): “It seems to
be a very practical solution. I am convinced that such a system will be used
in the future.”; “The system was easy to use and intuitive”; “Very good, a
hybrid system is better than a fully electronic one”, “After a short familiar-
ization phase, the system appears clear and simple. It could be very conve-
nient for the concerns regarding university elections.”. 26 of 166 participants
did not understand the advantages of the electronic voting system compared
to the traditional paper-based system. They were mostly surprised why a
printout was needed if they are voting electronically. Some participants also
had di culties using the prototype. Here are some of the reasons: 15 partic-
ipants complained that the printing process is too slow; seven participants
complained that the touchscreen did not react very fast; three participants
were confused that the button leading to the next step was on the left side of
the interface; three participants had not perceived that there was a preview
screen; two participants would had preferred a bigger status bar informing
them about the validity of their vote; one participant was confused with the
last screen and thought something went wrong; one participant would have
preferred a bigger platform for folding the printout. Participants gave also
valuable feedback w.r.t. the information provided to the participants and the
public in general and regarding organizational processes: Eight participants
would have liked more information about the system (about the QR-Code,
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system interconnection, processing of the data); two participants suggested
that we should have had more advertising and should have not set up our
polling station into a small corner; One participant suggested that back-up
printouts (empty paper ballots) are important in case of failure. Further,
two participants criticized the prototype as not matured and that it provides
to much information. Finally, only 14 participants do not support the use of
electronic voting in general because of secrecy concerns.
Table 2 summarizes participants’ opinion regarding the statement “In the
next university elections I would like to use the electronic voting system I just
used”, while Table 3 regarding “I would like to cast my vote electronically in
the next university’s elections”.
Likert rating No. of participants %
strongly disagree 22 11,1
rather does not apply 31 15,7
neither nor 46 23,2
rather agree 73 36,9
strongly agree 26 13,1
Table 2: Using EasyVote in the upcoming universtiy elections.
Likert rating No. of participants %
strongly disagree 24 12,1
rather does not apply 26 13,1
neither nor 49 24,7
rather agree 63 31,8
strongly agree 36 18,2
Table 3: Support regarding e-voting in general.
The result regarding the statment “I think that vote secrecy might be vi-
olated by the use of the QR-Code.” show that 39.9% of the participants have
concerns regarding vote secrecy due to the use of QR-Code. This confirms
the findings of Llewellyn et al. [14]. We conclude that in general participants




During the user study we identified a number of lessons learned: First, it
is important to clearly communicate the advantages of the electronic voting
system compared to the traditional paper-based system or any other known
system to the participants. Second, the printing process should be faster, in
order to not confuse voters during the vote casting process. The same also
holds true for the touch screen. We need to review the process for creating
two original live CDs from independent platforms, which would have the same
hash value. This process did not succeed in the user study, thus we created
only copies of the one original live CD. Further, participants shall be provided
with su cient information regarding the operation and all components of
the system. It is also important that participants are clearly informed about
the steps of the vote casting process, as poll workers identified a number
deviations. These deviations are summarized in Table 4.
No. of participants
Printout left in the voting booth 16 out of 421
“Finish vote casting” not clicked 20 out of 421
Printout not folded 14 out of 421
Table 4: Deviations during vote casting process.
In order to prevent confusion and long queues, poll workers should be
provided with clear instructions about the enabling device. It is also very
important to provide participants with the adequate amount of information.
Finally, we note that we did not have any technical or organizational issues
during the user study, and everything worked flawlessly.
8. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper report on an implementation and evaluation of a first proto-
type based on the EasyVote voting system [2]. The results of the evaluation
are very positive regarding EasyVote and e-voting in general. Thus, 73.2% of
198 participants would support the use of EasyVote in upcoming university
elections, while 74.7% of the 198 participants support e-voting in general.
The results also provide a number of interesting research questions for
the future. Thus, for future work, we plan to design a user study to address
voters’ secrecy concerns when using encoded information on printouts. In
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addition we will have the poll workers evaluate the system, guidelines and
protocols, as due to time constraints we were not able to do so. Further, we
plan to analyze if it is technically possible to create two original live CDs
independent from the platform. We are going implement and evaluate a
prototype for complex ballots and voting rules, e.g. local elections in Hesse,
while considering all lessons learned. However, this also includes open issues,
like content on the printout, designing the user study, and providing adequate
interfaces (including colors). As parties are generally associated to colors,
these colors must be excluded in the design of interfaces. Afterwards, we plan
to address organizational and technical measures that prevent information
leakage through electro-magnetic radiations and power consumption.
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